摘 要:從股權分置改革開始，我國現(xiàn)代企業(yè)所有權和經(jīng)營權的分離促進了企業(yè)的快速發(fā)展和進步，但與此同時，也帶來了企業(yè)所有者和經(jīng)營者之間的委托代理問題。那么，我們要如何解決企業(yè)的委托代理問題？目前，已經(jīng)有相當多的國內(nèi)外學者對高管持股進行了大量的研究，發(fā)現(xiàn)通過高管持股方式可以在一定程度上減少委托代理所產(chǎn)生的問題，但是高管持股還是會帶來其他負面效應，比如，高管通過增減持本公司的股票來謀取私人收益。而現(xiàn)有研究文獻大部分只研究了高管持股帶來的正負效應，但沒有對高管增減持股票過程中的市場反應、是否存在盈余管理行為等問題進行深入、系統(tǒng)的研究。

　　　本文首先運用委托代理理論、信號傳遞理論和信息不對稱理論等對我國上市公司高管增減持股票行為進行理論分析，在此基礎上，以2006年至2011年間高管增減持股票的上市公司為研究樣本，建立數(shù)理計量模型對高管增減持股票過程中的市場反應及是否存在盈余管理行為進行系統(tǒng)研究，力圖從經(jīng)驗數(shù)據(jù)角度揭示我國上市公司高管增減持股票行為和盈余管理之間的關系。研究結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn)：高管增持公司的累計超常收益率在增持公告日前為負數(shù)，而高管減持公司的累計超常收益率在減持公告日前為正數(shù)；高管增持上市公司存在提前披露壞消息或延遲披露好消息的偏好，而高管減持上市公司則相反；高管在增持股票過程中存在負向盈余管理行為，而在減持股票過程中存在正向盈余管理行為。希望本研究結(jié)果能夠為證券監(jiān)管機構加強對上市公司高管增減持股票行為的監(jiān)督和保護股東及其他利益相關者提供決策參考依據(jù)。

關鍵詞：高管增減持；盈余管理；監(jiān)管

ABSTRACT:From the share reform on, theseparation between ownership and management of China's modern enterprises promoted the rapid development and progress of enterprises, but at the same time, it also brought the principal-agent problem between owners and operators. So, how can we solve the principal-agent problem? At present, there have been quite a number of domestic and foreign scholars have conducted a lot of research on the executive holding stock problem, and found that senior managers stocks’ holding can solve consignment-agent problem, but senior managers stocks’ holding also lead to some negative effects. Existing literature mainly studies the economic consequences of managerial ownership, but the study on the market effects and the economic consequences between managerial holding stocks’ change and earnings management is not very rich. 

　　　This paper used agency theory, signaling theory and asymmetric information theory to theoretically analyze senior managers’ adding or reducing holding stocks behavior, and and established three econometric models to study the relationship between senior managers’ adding or reducing holding stocks and earnings management and its economic consequences through descriptive statistical analysis and empirical analysis. The article also established econometric models to systematically study senior managers’ adding or reducing holding stocks, earnings management and its economic consequences through empirical analysis with Listed Companies’ data as samples during year 2006 to 2011. The conclusions are the following: the stock cumulative abnormal returns of executive’ adding stock holdings listed companies were negative before the announcement, but executive’ reducing stick holdings listed companies had positive stock cumulative abnormal returns significantly before the announcement.Executives’ adding stock holdings listed companies tended to disclose bad news early, or delayed disclosure of good news, and executives’ adding stock holdings listed companies on the contrary. There were negative earnings management behaviors in the process of executives’ adding stock holdings,but positive earnings management behaviors in the process of executives’ reducing stock holdings. We hope that this study can provide references for the securities regulatory authority to strengthened supervise listed companies executives’ behavior and protect other stakeholders.

Keywords:  Executives’ adding or reducing stock holdings; earnings management; supervision