譯文（字數 3671）：

過度投資的自由現金流量

   這篇文章將探討在自由現金流量下企業(yè)的投資決策。從理論上來說，企業(yè)投資水平不應與內部自由現金流量有關系（莫迪利亞尼和米勒，1958年）。但是，以前的研究已經證明投資支出與自由現金流量存在正相關的關系（例如，哈伯德，1998年）。對這種正相關的關系有兩種解釋。首先，這種正相關的關系是代理問題的一個表現，那些擁有自由現金流量的公司經理浪費了開支（例如，詹森，1986；斯圖爾茲，1990）。當經理的目標與那些股東不同，在內部的存在產生自由現金流量超過那些需要保持現有資產的地方，新的明確的凈現值規(guī)劃創(chuàng)造的這些潛在的資金可能被浪費掉。第二，這種正相關的關系反映資本市場的不完全，昂貴的外部融資創(chuàng)造了內部潛在的自由現金流量，以擴大潛在的可行的投資機會集（例如，法茲澤瑞，哈伯德和彼得森，1988；哈伯德，1998）。

外文原文（字符數 11329）：

外文出處 Review of Accounting Studies, 2006, Vol.11 (2), pp.159-189

Over-investment of free cash flow

This paper examines firm investing decisions in the presence of free cash flow. In theory, firm level investment should not be related to internally generated cash flows (Modigliani & Miller, 1958). However, prior research has documented a positive relation between investment expenditure and cash flow (e.g., Hubbard, 1998). There are two interpretations for this positive relation. First, the positive relation is a manifestation of an agency problem, where managers in firms with free cash flow engage in wasteful expenditure (e.g.,Jensen 1986; Stulz 1990). When managers’ objectives differ from those of shareholders, the presence of internally generated cash flow in excess of that required to maintain existing assets in place and finance new positive NPV projects creates the potential for those funds to be squandered. Second, the positive relation reflects capital market imperfections, where costly external financing creates the potential for internally generated cash flows to expand the feasible investment opportunity set (e.g., Fazzari, Hubbard, & Petersen,1988; Hubbard, 1998).